Protecting Vital and Pressing Governmental Interests—A Proposal for a New Zoning Enabling Act by Kmiec, Douglas W.
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 30 Housing Symposium
January 1986
Protecting Vital and Pressing Governmental
Interests—A Proposal for a New Zoning Enabling
Act
Douglas W. Kmiec
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Douglas W. Kmiec, Protecting Vital and Pressing Governmental Interests—A Proposal for a New Zoning Enabling Act, 30 Wash. U. J. Urb.
& Contemp. L. 19 (1986)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol30/iss1/3
PROTECTING VITAL AND PRESSING
GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS-A
PROPOSAL FOR A NEW ZONING
ENABLING ACT
DOUGLAS W. KMIEC*
More and more evidence suggests that government at all levels has
created much of the affordable housing crisis. Of course, no single eco-
nomic factor can surpass the adverse impact of excessive government
spending at the federal level on housing and interest rates. Nothing in
this article, by virtue of its focus on state and local land use control,
should be construed as suggesting that correction of regulatory abuse
will right the far greater damage done by inflationary policies. Never-
theless, by restricting the supply of land and increasing the cost of site
construction, state and local zoning and subdivision controls have
driven new home prices to unnecessarily high levels. In short, one can
now convincingly demonstrate that less government would result in
more house at less cost. Many local communities, however, continue
* Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the United States, Office of Legal Counsel,
U.S. Department of Justice; Professor of Law and Director of the Thomas J. White
Center on Law & Government at the University of Notre Dame (on leave). A former
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Professor
Kmiec's single volume treatise on land use, the ZONING AND PLANNING DESKBOOK,
recently was published by Clark Boardman. An earlier version of this paper was
presented at a conference on Affordable Housing at the University of California, San
Diego, in March, 1985. Portions of this article are reprinted here with permission from
9 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW REPORT I (Jan. 1986) published by Clark Boardman
Company, 435 Hudson Street, New York, N.Y. 10014. The views expressed herein are
those of the author, and not necessarily those of the Department of Justice.
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to regulate in a manner that either imposes subjective and costly aes-
thetic preferences, or arbitrarily adopts the misguided opinions of a
central planner over the informed wisdom reflected in the cumulative
demand of thousands of housing consumers.
In recognition of this problem, the President's Commission on Hous-
ing has recommended that states replace present zoning enabling acts,
which broadly authorize any land use control that can somehow be
said to promote the general welfare, with a more specific and demand-
ing standard. Specifically, the Commission recommended:
To protect property rights and to increase the production of hous-
ing and lower its cost, all State and local legislatures should enact
legislation providing that no zoning regulations denying or limit-
ing the development of housing should be deemed valid unless
their existence or adoption is necessary to achieve a vital and
pressing governmental interest. In litigation, the governmental
body seeking to maintain or impose the regulation should bear the
burden for proving it complies with the foregoing standard.'
Dean Cribbet and Professor Johnson recently reprinted the Commis-
sion's policy recommendations in their casebook on property and fol-
lowed it with the unanswered question: "Are these recommendations
sound?"2
The clear answer to this question is that these recommendations are
sound. Four considerations affirm their soundness: (1) constitutional
theory; (2) a correct understanding of the Supreme Court's decision in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty;3 (3) an examination of recent judi-
cial frustration with the zoning process in Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel4 and Fasano v. Board of Com-
missioners;5 and (4) the mounting empirical evidence of the cost of reg-
ulatory abuse.6
First, with respect to constitutional theory, one must examine the
source of a local governing body's authority over land use matters. All
too frequently, courts do not look behind the zoning enabling act7 to
1. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING 200 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMM'N].
2. J. CRIBBIT & D. JOHNSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 1132 (1984).
3. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
4. 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
5. 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1983).
6. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
7. Forty-seven states authorize local communities to enact land use regulations pur-
suant to provisions that resemble the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act of 1924, as
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determine if the act itself exceeds the power of the state.
In constitutional terms, a state's power is derived from the inherent
police or regulatory power which the tenth amendment reserved to the
states. The fact that most recent tenth amendment cases have con-
cerned the extent of state authority, or lack of it, with respect to the
federal government,8 should not obscure a careful exploration of the
extent of the state's power over individual landowners. Some may wish
to avoid this issue in order to prevent limiting state governments from
two opposite directions at once. No one, however, would credibly ar-
gue for giving the state unlimited reign over the individual as rectifica-
tion for the judicially-created federalism imbalance. To do so would be
nothing more than a new feudalism, with the states as vassals of the
federal government and individual property owners performing peon-
age for the states.
There is little question but that the tenth amendment provides states
with authority over the individual property owner. As a matter of con-
stitutional philosophy, however, that authority is not unlimited be-
cause the authority itself is derived from individual citizens or "the
people." It becomes necessary, therefore, to ask what authority the
people have. In other words, only if individuals have yielded to the
states some authority or right, which was properly theirs to yield, is the
state's exercise of power, or its delegation of power to local zoning bod-
ies, legitimate.
Ought one individual have a right to dictate to another the use of the
other's property? In cases when the other's property use would physi-
cally harm another individual's person or property, the answer is
clearly yes. When, however, one's use of property would merely dis-
please another individual, the answer is just as clearly no.
A simple example will help illustrate this point. Assume that a city
zoning ordinance denies a landowner the right to construct six de-
tached houses on a vacant, one-acre parcel. The ordinance requires-
under the guise of the "general welfare"-one-acre minimum lots.
revised in 1926, and promulgated by the Department of Commerce. The Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act allows virtually any land use control so long as it promotes the
"health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community." The amorphous gen-
eral welfare requirement, when coupled with the presumptive validity of legislative acts,
insulates most land use regulation from meaningful scrutiny.
8. The demise of state sovereignty is apparent in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). For a general discussion of the imbalance in
federal-state relations, see Kmiec & Diamond, New Federalism is Not Enough: The
Privatization of Non-Public Goods, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 321 (1984).
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Under current law in most, if not all, states the requirement will be
presumed valid and upheld absent the showing of an exclusionary im-
pact or the total destruction of the landowner's investment-backed ex-
pectations. The requirement should, however, be considered patently
illegitimate because limiting the density of land use to one house rather
than six is almost certainly unrelated to any meaningful concern with
physical harm. In this regard, one individual could not legitimately
require another to observe such limitation; therefore, it is sheer sophis-
try to suggest that the state, which derives its power from the individ-
ual, could do any more.
The property clauses in the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the
Constitution serve to emphasize this point. Together these amend-
ments explicitly prohibit both Congress and the states from depriving a
person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The
fifth amendment further prohibits the taking of private property with-
out "just compensation." In addition, the fourteenth amendment em-
powers Congress to enforce the prohibition against state deprivations
of these rights "by appropriate legislation."
Yet, these constitutional protections have proven harshly illusory for
most landowners. The Supreme Court has protected landowners only
from actual physical invasions9 or virtual confiscation.' 0 Moreover, it
is no longer clear, as it seemed to be after Justice Brennan's dissent in
San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. City of San Diego," that even a
quasi-majority of the Court would award monetary compensation to a
landowner whose property has been effectively taken by regulation. In
this regard, in its recent decision in Williamson County Regional Plan-
ning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,'2 the Court substantially fore-
closed access to the federal courts on regulatory taking claims by
imposing an unrealistic finality requirement. As a consequence of
9. See, e.g., Loretto Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)
(cable ordinance authorized physical installation without owner's permission); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (public access to nonnavigable pond);
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (airplane overflights).
10. It is something of an overstatement to suggest that the Supreme Court even has
protected landowners from virtual confiscation, because their most recent pronounce-
ment on determining when a taking occurs, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), relies upon a highly unsatisfactory case-by-case ap-
proach to determine whether there has been an impermissible interference with invest-
ment backed expectations.
11. 450 U.S. 621, 637 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
12. 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985).
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Hamilton Bank, a landowner must pursue all theoretically available
administrative variances and state remedies before seeking compensa-
tion from a federal tribunal. Apparently this includes pursuing vari-
ances from the same planning commission that just told the landowner
to "get lost," as was the case in Hamilton Bank. In addition, a land-
owner's Section 1983 action is kept out of the federal forum, because
the Court convinced itself that there is a meaningful distinction be-
tween administrative exhaustion, which is not required for Section
1983 actions, 3 and administrative finality.1
4
Quite obviously, the Court's decision in Hamilton Bank is a major
setback for landowners. Not only does it remove the mantel of legiti-
macy accorded to Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego favoring the
availability of compensatory remedies for regulatory takings, but it also
reveals the Court's great reluctance to admit that regulatory takings
even exist. Although the majority does not decide the issue, it leans
heavily in favor of the view that excessive regulation is not a taking at
all, but at best, a deprivation of due process. Justice Stevens' concur-
rence is clear on this point. To him, "temporary takings" that result
from governmental decisionmaking are "fairly characterized as an in-
evitable cost of doing business in a highly regulated society."
Presently on appeal to the Supreme Court is the unpublished deci-
sion of the California Court of Appeal in MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates v. County of Yolo. " In MacDonald, the California court denied
monetary relief to a landowner whose tentative plat for residential de-
velopment was rejected by the county board. Even though the land
was designated for residential use on the county plan, the nearby City
of Davis had it designated as "agricultural reserve" and refused to ex-
tend access and other city services, which denials became the basis for
the county's action. The landowner claimed that an agricultural use
was infeasible because of the prior removal of topsoil, the presence of
nematodes, and nearby residential development.
Because the landowner did not present alternative development
plans when its tentative plan was rejected, the Court may view Mac-
Donald as insufficiently ripe to reach the underlying constitutional is-
sue, just as it did in Hamilton Bank. Because the county demurred,
however, to the landowner's allegations of the futility of other relief
and complete deprivation, it is possible for the Court to view the ripe-
13. Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
14. 105 S. Ct, at 3120.
15. Case No. 3 Civ. 22306.
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ness considerations as satisfied. The Department of Justice has for the
first time argued as amicus curiae that "the merits of this case are im-
portant and deserve resolution."' 6 Most significantly, the Justice De-
partment concludes in its brief that: "[b]ecause regulation of land may
constitute a 'taking,' within the contemplation of the Fifth Amend-
ment, and because a temporary appropriation of land likewise can con-
stitute a 'taking,' it would seem to follow inexorably that a regulatory
restriction on the use of land that is only of temporary duration may
also, in appropriate circumstances, constitute a 'taking' that implicates
the Just Compensation Clause."' 7
Through it all, one should remember that, even if the Court sanc-
tions the monetary remedy in MacDonald, it will mean only that com-
pensation is available for the most extreme cases of regulatory abuse,
not that regulatory abuse is at an end. Nevertheless, do not be misled.
The fact that current constitutional interpretation does not support the
recommendations of the President's Housing Commission does not
mean that sound constitutional theory and principle are not in full
agreement.
Turning to Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty,'" the President's
Commission recommended that the Attorney General re-examine the
zoning standard enunciated in that seminal decision to determine if the
Commission's standard might not be presented to the Supreme Court
as an alternative."' Although that is entirely appropriate, it is sug-
gested that a correct interpretation of Euclid already supports the
Commission's recommendation.
First, it is well-recognized that even though Euclid upheld the gen-
eral constitutionality of zoning, it expressly left open the question of
challenging specific applications of a zoning ordinance.20 Indeed,
shortly thereafter the Euclid Court invalidated a specific application of
an ordinance in Nectow v. City of Cambridge.2' Nevertheless, many
overlook the standard that the Euclid Court suggested for evaluating
specific applications of zoning measures. The standard employed in
Euclid was sic utere tuo lut alienum non laedes-use your own prop-
16. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16.
17. Id. at 20.
18. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
19. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 201.
20. 272 U.S. at 387, 390.
21. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
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erty in such a manner as not to injure that of another.22 Arguably,
even a liberal adherence to this nuisance based standard would reach a
result similar to that suggested by the President's Commission.
Commentary contemporaneous with the Euclid decision suggests
that while the Euclid Court may not have believed that common law
nuisance and the police power were exact equivalents, the Court surely
viewed the police power as principally concerned with the prevention
of harm. Thus, Professor Freund writing twenty years before Euclid
could state that "under the police power [the state takes property] be-
cause it is harmful ' 2 3 and James Metzenbaum, the foremost advocate
of zoning who represented the Village of Euclid, wrote four years after
the case: "Unless a [zoning ordinance] is enacted for the purpose of
protecting the public safety, health or welfare, it cannot be expected to
meet with the approval of the courts. And this is as it should be."
24
The facts of Euclid support this narrow interpretation. This too has
been obscured, however, because the Court accepted in that case an
ordinance that segregated single family homes from apartments, a seg-
regation that is unjustifiable in view of modern construction practices.
The Court, however, was not reviewing modern construction practices,
but rather, tenements that, in the Court's own words, "[came] very
near to being nuisances."2 5
When viewed in this light, it becomes clear that current Supreme
Court interpretation may not only be at odds with basic constitutional
theory or principle, but also with the Court's own precedent. To com-
prehend how far the present Court has strayed one need only remem-
ber the Court's recent rejection in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York 26 of the landowner's attempt to distinguish an aes-
thetically based landmark preservation ordinance from earlier deci-
sions concerned with the noxious use of land. Without support, the
Court commented, "these cases are better understood as resting not on
any supposed 'noxious' quality of the prohibited uses but rather on the
ground that the restrictions were reasonably related to the implementa-
tion of a policy-not unlike historic preservation-expected to produce
22. 272 U.S. at 387.
23, E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER § 511 (1904).
24. J. METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING 7 (1930).
25. 272 U.S. at 395. See Babcock and Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apart-
ment Boom, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 1040-49 (1963).
26. 438 U.S, 104 (1978).
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widespread public benefit...., 27
Of course, unlimited police power and uncontrolled land use author-
ity does not necessarily produce widespread public benefits. As the
decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel 1)2"
reveals, such authority can easily result in widespread regulatory
abuse. Mt. Laurel had placed over one-third of its developable land
into an industrial holding zone and set aside the rest of its land for
expensive single family homes on large lots. In Mt. Laurel I in 1975,
the state supreme court instructed the community to redraft its ordi-
nance to purge it of its exclusionary features. The community re-
sponded, just as one might expect a community drunk with its own
regulatory power, by rezoning 20 acres out of a possible 14,300 acres
for multi-family use. Moreover, most of those 20 acres were, according
to the evidence, "low lying and swampy, and ... covered with rank,
dense underbrush."29 The New Jersey court tolerated this affront until
1983 when, in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II),3o it took over the land use process in
that state in what is nothing short of a judicial preemption of legislative
prerogatives.
Mt. Laurel I confirms the soundness of the Commission's recom-
mendations, as do similar exclusionary zoning decisions in Penn-
sylvania,31 New York,32 and even to a very limited extent, California. 33
Most of these decisions provide that once an ordinance is shown to be
prima facie exclusionary, the burden of justification shifts to the munic-
27. Id. at 133-34 & n.30.
28. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808
(1975).
29. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 161 N.J.
Super. 317, 391 A.2d 935 (Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1978).
30. 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
31. See, e.g., National Land and Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597
(1965).
32. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
33. California explicitly rejected the activist approach of New Jersey in Associated
Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41
(1976). California, however, does require local governments to "consider the effect...
on the housing needs of the region in which the local jurisdiction is situated and balance
these needs against the public service needs of its residents and available fiscal and envi-
ronmental resources." CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 65863.6, 66412.3 (Deering Supp. 1985).
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ipality. The policy proposed by the President's Commission would do
this as a matter of course.
There is another line of state court opinions that are seldom thought
of as similar to the Mount Laurel variety, but which also reflect judicial
frustration with zoning abuse. In these cases, courts reclassify zone
amendments as quasi-judicial in order to subject them to greater judi-
cial scrutiny. The most noted case in this area is that of the Oregon
Supreme Court in Fasano v. Board of Commissioners.34 While the
Fasano-type cases are not necessarily prodevelopment, they do reflect
the same judicial skepticism of unbridled police power as the exclusion-
ary cases. Fasano and its progeny, of course, utilize the comprehensive
plan as the method of regaining control of the regulatory apparatus.
The Mount Laurel II decision does the same, placing the heaviest bur-
den of proof on any exclusionary community designated as a "growth
area" on the State Development Guide Plan.
One should not mistake the preceding analysis as an endorsement of
either Mount Laurel I1 or Fasano, for it is not. Although these courts
deserve considerable credit for identifying regulatory abuse, both ap-
proaches are greatly flawed. With respect to Mount Laurel I, no judi-
cial entity known to man has the capability to apply its standard. To
pretend that there is a readily ascertainable definition of housing re-
gion, to pretend that there is a readily ascertainable definition of pres-
ent housing need, to pretend that there is a readily ascertainable
definition of prospective housing need, and then, to pretend that any-
one will agree on what their "fair share" of these needs are-is, well,
just to pretend. 3' The limitations of the judicial role recently led the
34. In Fasano, the Board of County Commissioners of Washington County author-
ized a zone change for a 32-acre parcel of land. The change allowed a development
company to build a mobile home park on land that had formerly been zoned as single
family residential. Several homeowners filed a petition to have the Commissioners' de-
cision reversed in court. Both the trial court and the court of appeals reversed the
Commissioners' order because the Commissioners had not shown any change in the
character of the neighborhood that would justify the rezoning. 7 Or. App. 176, 489
P.2d 693 (1971). In affirming the court of appeals' decision, the Oregon Supreme Court
rejected the Commissioners' argument that the change was a legislative act and, there-
fore, presumptively valid. 264 Or. at 580-81, 507 P.2d at 26. The court held, instead,
that the change was quasi-judicial in nature and, as such, was subject to a higher stan-
dard of review. Id. 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
35. The extraordinary task of complying with Mt. Laurel I1 already has spawned a
book of its own. See R. BURCHELL, W. BEATON, AND D. LISTOKEN, MT. LAUREL 1:
CHALLENGE AND DELIVERY OF LOW COST HOUSING (1983). Problems in complying
with Mt. Laurel 1H, and its unintended effects are discussed in Rose, The Mt. Laurel II
Decision: Is it Based on Wishful Thinking? 12 REAL EST. L.J. 115 (1983).
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New Jersey legislature to pass legislation creating a Council on Afford-
able Housing. The Council is to be appointed by the Governor with
the advice and consent of the Senate.36
Under the New Jersey legislation, a municipality has the option of
submitting for Council review a housing element designed to achieve
its present and prospective housing needs. If the Council certifies the
housing element, then those bringing exclusionary zoning cases against
the municipality first must seek review and mediation from the Council
itself. In addition, the Council's substantive certification creates a pre-
sumption of validity in the housing element and implementing ordi-
nances, which can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence.
Finally, certification yields relative preference for monies set aside in a
fair housing trust fund account.
The legislation provides all municipalities a respite from the
"builder's remedy"-that is, court imposed zoning measures such as
mandatory set-asides or density bonuses-at least up to the date by
which a municipality must submit a housing element. There is also
generally available a twelve month moratorium on previously granted,
but not implemented, judicial decrees that require the provision of low
and moderate income housing. The moratorium is available to the ex-
tent that the vested rights of the developer are not affected and the
judgment requires "provision of any housing in the municipality which
is not affordable."
Obviously, the legislation is extremely complex, and is likely to tax
the capability of even the administrative Council created by it, if for no
other reason than the difficulty of amassing, and keeping current, infor-
mation pertaining to present and prospective housing needs. Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court of New Jersey recently has decided that it will
tolerate, at least temporarily, this reassertion of legislative power by the
legislature.37
Fasano is unworkable for much the same reason. The advance plan-
ning of developing communities is beyond human capacity and in some
36. Act of July 2, 1985, ch. 222, 1985 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 46 (Pamphlet No. 7).
37. In The Hills Development Co. v. Township of Bernards, Case No. A-122-85,
decided February 20, 1986, the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the constitutional-
ity of the state Fair Housing Act and allowed the transfer of Mt. Laurel cases to the
Council created by the Act. At a number of junctures, however, the court cautioned
that it might reassert jurisdiction where the state constitutional obligation was not being
met. For example, in commenting upon the Act's moratorium on the builder's remedy,
the court noted that if the moratorium resulted in the Mt. Laurel obligation not being
met, then the Act may be declared unconstitutional. Slip Opinion at 57-58.
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ways directly antithetical to the dynamic nature of the planning pro-
cess itself.38 More fundamentally, as already suggested, the judicial ac-
tivity in these cases is contrary to basic notions of separation of powers
implicit in our federal and state governmental systems. In short,
although Mount Laurel, Fasano and the President's Commission all
correctly identify the problem of regulatory abuse, only the Commis-
sion has identified an acceptable and workable solution.
One final consideration in support of the Commission's recommen-
dations is the now overwhelming empirical evidence that when zoning
is out of control, it is a cost borne largely by the housing consumer.
The most recent Urban Policy Report states that the cost of excessive
regulation is as much as 25% of the final unit price of a home.39 This
general observation is borne out by specific studies. Econometric esti-
mation of the cost of growth controls in California reveals that these
land use measures accounted for more than 27% of the increase in real
housing prices during the period from 1972-1979.' An on-going site
demonstration study by the U.S. Department of Housing & Urban De-
velopment indicates that by eliminating needless site preparation re-
quirements and density restrictions, the cost of housing units can be
consistently delivered for 20 to 30% less.4 In Boulder, Colorado,
housing costs between 1976 and 1979, before and after growth control,
rose 25% while the cost of a comparable house in two nearby commu-
nities increased only 11 %.42
Assuming that the Commission's recommendations are accepted as
sound, the next, and perhaps most important, step is to decide upon a
means of implementation. The Commission suggests three approaches.
38. See generally Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 719 (1980);
Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Control as Problem of Local Legitimacy,
71 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1983).
39. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, THE PRESI-
DENT'S NATIONAL URBAN POLICY REPORT 64 (1984).
40. Mercer and Morgan, An Estimate of Residential Growth Controls' Impact on
Housing Prices, reprinted in RESOLVING THE HOUSING CRISIS 189 (M.B. Johnson ed.
1982).
41. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, Office of Policy
Development and Research, case study of Lincoln, Nebraska, affordable housing dem-
onstration (October 1982) indicating that among other things land development costs
were reduced by 25%. Under its "Joint Venture for Affordable Housing," the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development has produced a number of publications in-
cluding a user bibliography on the subject.
42. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS, THE DANISH PLAN RETRO-
SPECT: A LOOK AT GROWTH MANAGEMENT ISSUES IN BOULDER, COLORADO (1981).
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Optimally, states will respond to the the challenge by incorporating the
vital and pressing governmental interest standard into state zoning en-
abling acts.4 3 Second, if states fail to act, the Commission urges locali-
ties to employ the standard in local ordinances.' Finally, as noted
earlier, the Commission also recommends that the Attorney General
consider utilizing the standard in appropriate litigation in order to have
it judicially sanctioned as constitutional doctrine.45
Clearly, the first alternative, state enactment, is preferable. Not only
is it more expeditious than the piecemeal local approach, but it is also
more cognizant of the proper roles of the legislature and the judiciary.
Although Supreme Court recognition of the proper limits of the police
power would be welcome, strong traditions of federalism suggest that
individual states should give content to the exact meaning of the vital
and pressing governmental interest standard. A number of the Com-
missioners stated exactly this view.4 6
Of course, favoring state enactment does not mean that those con-
cerned with the affordable housing crisis should not help the states in
drafting legislation. To provide some assistance in this area, a model
statute representing this draftsman's attempt to have the vital and
pressing governmental interest standard enacted into law follows. In
brief, the statute seeks:
1. To expressly limit land use authority to "the enactment of regula-
tions which promote a vital and pressing governmental interest." The
express statement is meant as a substitute for the vague, and often un-
definable, "general welfare" standard that presently exists in most state
enabling acts.
2. To define vital and pressing governmental interests as dealing pri-
marily with collective public goods and infrastructure, and not primar-
ily the design or location of private improvements. Thus, the statute
would allow local governments to continue regulating and providing
for the availability of sanitary sewer, water, street, utility and other
public infrastructure, but they could not impose site design require-
ments with only an aesthetic justification.
The standard proposed in the model statute also allows for "the seg-
regation or exclusion of noxious, nuisance-like or subnormal uses ...
43. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note I, at 200.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 201.
46. Id. at 202.
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which create a substantial and unreasonable risk of harm to the person
or property of others." As Professor Siegan's classic study of the
nonzoned City of Houston reveals, most of this segregation will occur
quite naturally pursuant to market choice.4 7 The marginal cases which
do not exhibit segregation will be covered by this provision. Although
there may be disagreement as to what is noxious or nuisance-like, there
is considerable common law in the nuisance area to provide guidance.
Those dissatisfied with the vagaries of common law nuisance may wish
to expressly define a standard of normalcy in terms of existing develop-
ment within the community.4" In fact, the model statute does just that.
A few matters expressly are set out as not being in furtherance of a
vital and pressing governmental interest. These include highly restric-
tive and generalized growth controls, the placement of costs attributa-
ble to the community at large upon a specific landowner, aesthetic
regulation, and insupportable differentiations between site-built and
manufactured housing.49
3. To allow landowners and neighbors a reasonably expeditious way
to challenge regulations enacted under the model statute.
There is perhaps nothing more unsatisfactory than the current judi-
cial remedies available to landowners harmed by regulatory abuse.
The litigation is costly and unlikely to result in any definitive relief.
Nevertheless, the late Don Hagman suggested that in taking cases mu-
nicipalities need to have their attention focused.50 Professor Hagman
relied upon administrative exhaustion for this purpose. The model
statute employs a more informal notice of alleged invalidity to which
the local governing body is given a limited statutory period to respond.
If the response is unsatisfactory, the landowner may appeal promptly
to a hearing examiner and then to the courts.
In accordance with the Commission's recommendations, 5 1 the stat-
ute affords neighbors within 300 feet of the regulated property the same
opportunity to challenge a regulation as the landowner.
47. Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J. L. & ECON. 71, 142-43 (1970).
48. Professor Robert Ellickson has elaborated on the importance of distinguishing
between above-normal, normal and subnormal uses in pursuit of an efficient land use
control system. See Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 728-31 (1973).
49 On reasons why not to discriminate against manufactured housing, see Kmiec,
Manufactured Home Siting, 6 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 105-11, 113-17 (1983).
50. Hagman, Temporary or Interim Damages Awards in Land Use Control Cases, 4
ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 129, 134 (1981).
51. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N. supra note 1, at 201.
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4. To place the burden of proof or justification on the regulatory
body. Again, this approach is in accordance with both the Commis-
sion's recommendations and the approach taken in exclusionary zoning
cases under present law. Generalizing the requirement not only is
more protective of the concept of private property, but also properly
places the burden of proof upon the party most likely to have the best
information at the least cost.
5. To provide the landowner with monetary compensation for any
period of time in which his property is the subject of regulation which
does not promote a vital and pressing governmental interest. This is a
simple matter of fairness, recognized by Justice Brennan in San Diego,
and long overdue.
The model statute, of course, is just one proposal. It is anticipated
that if states choose to adopt this statute, or something like it, consider-
ation will be given to including within it other specific provisions re-
lated to local practice, such as those functions presently carried out by
the planning staff or commission in the review of proposed subdivision
plats. The actions of any administrative body, however, like its legisla-
tive counterpart, always should be expressly limited to promoting a
vital and pressing governmental interest. To quote James Metzen-
baum, the father of zoning, "This is as it should be."
Proposed Model State Land Use Enabling Statute
SECTION I
Land Use Authority Generally-Vital and Pressing
Governmental Interests
In order that cities, counties and other political subdivisions of
this state (hereafter collectively referred to as "political subdivi-
sions") shall be well-designed in a manner which secures the gen-
eral welfare of both existing and prospective residents thereof,
such political subdivisions are hereby empowered to enact only
such regulations as can be shown by the political subdivisions by a
preponderance of evidence to promote one or more of the follow-
ing vital and pressing governmental interests:
1. The assurance of the availability of adequate sanitary sewer,
water, street, utility and other public infrastructure
resources;
2. The mitigation or prevention of damage from natural
hazards, including fire or flood; or
3. The segregation or exclusion of noxious, nuisance-like, or
subnormal uses (by standards of existing development
within the political subdivision), or such other uses which
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create a substantial and unreasonable risk of harm to the
person or property of others.
SECTION II
Land Use Authority-Specific Regulatory Power
To carry out the above vital and pressing governmental inter-
ests, political subdivisions may:
I. Plan and build streets, parks, public buildings, schools,
storm and sanitary sewers, water mains, and such other fa-
cilities of public infrastructure as may be required;
2. Impose development fees, dedication requirements, servi-
tudes, user fees and special assessments as may be necessary
to cover the specific and unique fiscal costs of any proposed
improvement or development;
3. Regulate and limit the height, area, bulk and use of im-
provements to be erected hereafter; and
4. Regulate the intensity of use of land and lot areas.
Provided, however, that no such regulation may be adopted
which does not serve a vital and pressing governmental interest as
defined in Section I, including without limitation, regulations
which result in a generalized discouragement of the growth and
development of the political subdivision; the placement of costs
attributable to the political subdivision at large upon a specific
landowner; the promotion of merely aesthetic or other subjective
preferences unrelated to health and safety; or the differentiation of
site-built and manufactured homes unrelated to health and safety.
SECTION III
Land Use Authority-Challenge by Landowner or Neighbor
The validity of any land use regulation enacted pursuant to this
Title may be challenged by the regulated landowner or adjoining
neighbor within 300 feet of the regulated property by filing a writ-
ten notice of challenge with the governing body of the political
subdivision. Such notice shall state why the landowner or neigh-
bor believes the regulation either fails to promote a vital and press-
ing governmental interest as defined in Section I or is contrary to
those interests.
Within 30 days of receipt of the notice from a landowner or
neighbor, the political subdivision shall respond by either justify-
ing the sufficiency of the regulation under one or more of the spe-
cific vital and pressing governmental interests defined in Section I
of this Title or by modifying or repealing the regulation.
If after 30 days the political subdivision has not responded or
the regulated landowner or neighbor further disputes the validity
of the original or modified regulation, the regulation may be ap-
pealed to a hearing examiner acceptable to the landowner or
1986]
Washington University Open Scholarship
JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 30:19
neighbor or both and the political subdivision. The hearing exam-
iner shall conduct a hearing with representatives of the landowner
or neighbor or both and the political subdivision and enter a writ-
ten finding supported by substantial evidence as to whether the
challenged regulation promotes a vital and pressing governmental
interest.
The decision of the hearing examiner may be appealed to a
court of appropriate jurisdiction. In all proceedings, the political
subdivision shall bear the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence the existence of a vital and pressing governmental
interest as defined in Section I and the manner in which such regu-
lation promotes that interest.
In the event that the disputed regulation is partially or totally
invalidated by a court of last resort, the landowner shall be com-
pensated by the political subdivision for the full loss of market
value suffered by the landowner during the period the invalidated
regulation shall have been in effect plus costs.
SECTION IV
Land Use Authority-Effect on Existing Regulation
Any zoning classification or designation of vacant or improved
land among agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential, and
other uses and purposes, as well as any land use regulation depen-
dent upon such classification or designation, including without
limitation, regulations pertaining to height, area, design, bulk and
use of land or improvements, yards, or open space, enacted prior
to the effective date of this Title shall be advisory only unless re-
enacted by the political subdivision after the effective date thereof.
SECTION V
Land Use Authority-Effective Date
This title shall be effective 6 months following the date of its
Enactment.
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